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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Whether WILLIAM and AUDREY OLSEN (hereinafter "OLSENS") can 
be joined as defendants in the RDA's condemnation complaint 
depends on the factual issue of whether OLSENS have an "identity 
of interest" with the defendants already named in that action. 
Although the statute of limitations would normally bar this 
joinder, an exception is made if notice of the legal action may 
be imputed to OLSENS. In order to impute this notice to OLSENS, 
there must be a sufficient nexus between the parties already 
named and OLSENS. Whether this nexus exists is a factual issue 
to be determined by the finder of fact on a case-by-case basis. 
In the case at bar, there are several factors which form a 
sufficient nexus. These factors, individually, do not create the 
necessary identity of interest to override the statute of 
limitations. However, it is reasonable to conceive that a finder 
of fact could find that combined they are adequate to prove an 
identity of interest. Whether these factors exist is beyond the 
scope of a summary judgment, but must be determined by a finder 
of fact. Therefore, the lower court improperly allowed summary 
judgment in this case. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
"IDENTITY OP INTEREST" IS A FACTUAL ISSUE 
THAT MUST BE DETERMINED ON A CASE-BY-CASE 
BASIS. 
Whether an identity of interest exists between OLSENS and 
the original defendants in the condemnation case depends on the 
individual facts of this case because there is not a strict 
standard that must be applied. Whether an identity of interest 
exists is the key to this appeal and its application must be 
clear in order to apply it to the case at bar. An analysis of 
this issue is well explained in Hensley v. Soo-Line R. Co., 777 
F.Supp. 1421 (N.D.I11. 1991). In Hensley the court stated that 
"[e]ven if the added party did not receive actual notice, 
relation back may still occur if a sufficient identity of 
interest exists between the new and original defendants." Id. at 
1424. The court's conclusion shows the proper questions to ask, 
and the proper order to ask them: 
We conclude that Mid-South is a new defendant that was 
not named within the three year statute of limitations 
period. Further, we conclude that Mid-South did not 
have actual formal or informal notice of the suit 
before the expiration of the limitations period. 
Finally, we hold that Mid-South is not sufficiently 
connected to NLG to be considered the "same" under an 
identity of interest analysis. 
Id. at 1425. 
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Applying this to the case at bar produces the following 
series of questions: First, did the RDA try to join OLSENS 
within the statute of limitation period? If the answer is yes, 
then OLSENS should be joined. If the answer is no, and it is in 
the instant case, then a new question is asked: Did the new 
party have actual formal or informal notice of the suit before 
the limitations period expired? If the answer is yes, and there 
is a question of fact whether in the instant case the answer is 
yes, then OLSENS should be joined. If the answer is no, then one 
final question is asked: Is there a sufficient nexus between the 
original party and the party to be added to conclude an identity 
of interest exists? If the answer is yes, and this depends on 
evidence presented at trial, then the party should be joined. If 
the answer is no, then the party should not be joined and no 
further questions are asked. 
The proper question for analysis in this appeal is whether 
an identity of interest does exist. In the Hensley case, the 
court concluded it did not exist, and then discussed in detail 
the issue of whether there had been formal or informal notice. 
However, in discussing the identity of interest analysis, the 
court made an important observation, stating "[c]ircumstances 
other than the three stated above may nevertheless create a 
sufficient identity of interest." Id. at 1424. The three 
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circumstances they had just discussed involved business 
relationships. It is clear that there may be situations other 
than business relationships which may create an identity of 
interest. 
Other courts have agreed with this approach. "Identity of 
interest means that the parties are 'so closely related in their 
business operations or other activities that the institution of 
an action against one serves to provide notice of litigation to 
the other.' 6 Wright & Miller, supra, at 517." Spiker v. 
Hoocreboom. 628 P.2d 177, 179 (Colo.App. 1981) (emphasis added). 
Whether these "other activities" create an identity of interest 
is a question of fact for the fact finder to determine on a case-
by-case basis. 
The Utah Supreme Court has discussed this issue in two cases 
(Doxev-Layton Company v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902 (Utah 1976); Perry 
v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984)). In 
both cases the Court looked to the factual conclusions of the 
trial court, based on "other activities" to determine whether 
said activities were sufficient to create an identity of 
interest. In Doxey-Lavton, the Court concluded that being heirs 
to the original defendant was a sufficient nexus of other 
activities to create an identity of interest. In Perry, the 
Court concluded that privity of contract did not create an 
4 
identity of interest. 
In Doxey-Layton, the Court relied on evidence that showed 
"the real parties in interest were sufficiently alerted to the 
proceedings, or were involved in them unofficially, from an early 
stage" (Id. at 906) . The Court went on to mention other facts 
that may enter into the decision, stating: 
"Courts have also allowed amendments to relate back, by 
invoking an estoppel where an initial pleading error 
has been exploited until the running of the statue of 
limitations." Id. 
The Perry Court specifically relied on the Colorado Spiker 
court when they stated "[s]uch an identity exists, for example, 
between past and present forms of the same enterprise." Perry, 
681 P.2d at 217. The Court in Perry was faced with facts that 
could only support an identity of interest if there were close 
business ties; otherwise, there was no nexus. Therefore, the 
Court stated that "in this context [identity of interest] means 
that the parties are so closely related in their business 
operations . . .." Id. In other words, in the context of that 
specific fact pattern, the Court must find close business 
relations. The Court is not saying that the only situation 
supporting a finding, in all cases, of an identity of interest is 
in business relations. 
The Perry Court specifically looked to the evidence as found 
by a trial court, stating "there was no evidence showing any 
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identity of interest . . . ." Id. Clearly a careful reading of 
the Utah cases, and other cases as cited in the opening briefs, 
dictates that determining whether an identity of interest is 
created is an issue for the fact finder, and cannot be concluded 
as a matter of law. 0LSENS/ assertion that only business 
relations as discussed in Spiker or Perry create an identity of 
interest is simply a misreading of the cases. 
In the case at bar, the fact finder has much to consider as 
it determines whether there is a nexus which creates an identity 
of interest. Individually, the factors may seem insignificant; 
combined in this one situation, however, they may be adequate to 
convince a finder of fact that an identity of interest exists. 
Some of the facts that may be proven at trial include: Mr. Olsen 
was a co-owner of Olsen & Peterson Consulting Engineers, Inc. 
(the "Company"), the corporation already named as a defendant; 
Mr. Olsen leases two lots to the Company and these two lots are 
part of a six-lot unit used by the Company; Mr. Olsen and the 
Company use the same attorneys for their legal work; these 
attorneys delayed their reply to the original condemnation suit 
for over one month while the statute of limitations ran; the 
reply then stated that the Company did not own two of the 
parcels; while Appellants waited for a title search to be 
completed, Appellees began this action to hinder their joinder in 
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the condemnation suit. Naturally, other important facts may be 
revealed through discovery and the trial itself. 
If it is determined that these facts create an identity of 
interest, then notice to the original defendant of the 
condemnation case is imputed to OLSENS (Henslev. 777 F.Supp. at 
1424) . This imputed notice was given before the limitations 
period expired; therefore OLSENS suffer no prejudice. Because 
OLSENS suffer no prejudice, they should be freely joined in the 
condemnation suit. Since OLSENS can be joined, the summary 
judgment declaring that they cannot be sued is in error and 
should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the lower courts summary judgment 
order and remand for trial. Furthermore, this Court should order 
that the instant case be consolidated with the condemnation case, 
Redevelopment Agency of South Salt Lake City v. Olsen & Peterson 
Consulting Engineers, Civil No. 920906324. This Court should 
order that OLSENS be joined as defendants in the condemnation 
case, knowing that part of the facts that are to be determined at 
trial will relate to whether OLSENS have an identity of interest 
with Olsen & Peterson Consulting Engineers. 
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